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1 Introduction
The notion of single-peakedness has been of fundamental importance in many fields within
economic theory. An early application of single-peakedness is Black’s (1948) well-known
result that a preference-domain restriction of this nature ensures that the majority rule
generates transitive social preferences. The contributions by Inada (1969) and Sen (1970)
are other examples for the use of value restrictions that focus on single-peaked preference
profiles. Single-peakedness also appears in the study of strategy-proof social choice func-
tions; see, for instance, Moulin (1980) and Sprumont (1991). While much of the work on
single-peakedness focuses on one dimension, definitions suitable for higher dimensions are
available. These generalizations are used by Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993), Barbera`
and Jackson (1994), Dutta, Peters and Sen (2002), Ehlers and Storcken (2008) and Le
Breton and Weymark (2011), among others. Ballester and Haeringer (2011) character-
ize one-dimensional single-peaked preference profiles by providing necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of a single ranking such that all preferences in the profile are
single-peaked with respect to this ranking.
Single-peakedness is analyzed in a choice-theoretic setting by Bossert and Peters (2009).
The present paper generalizes the analysis carried out there to single-plateaued choice,
which within the same framework arises naturally if multi-valued instead of single-valued
choice is considered. See Moulin (1984) for an early contribution that employs single-
plateauedness in the context of voting theory. Berga (1998), Ehlers (2002), Barbera` (2007)
and Berga and Moreno (2009), among others, examine strategy-proofness with single-
plateaued preferences.
We do not impose any restriction on the dimension of the domain; our results are
valid for any fixed-dimensional Euclidean space. The basic object to be studied is a choice
correspondence that selects, for any fixed dimension n ∈ N, a non-empty, closed and
convex subset of chosen elements from each non-empty, compact and convex subset of
Rn, the Euclidean n-dimensional space. As is the case for Bossert and Peters (2009), we
concentrate on choice correspondences that satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives,
a contraction consistency condition that is closely related (but, in general, not equivalent)
to the rationalizability of a choice correspondence; see, for instance, Richter (1966, 1971).
Given the nature of the standard applications of single-peakedness and single-plateauedness,
this focus appears to be suitable for the issue to be addressed.
In the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives (or the weak axiom of re-
vealed preference which is equivalent to independence on our domain), we characterize
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single-plateaued choice by means of collinear interval continuity, a continuity property that
is restricted to points on the same line. While this result and its proof display some
analogy to the single-valued case examined in Bossert and Peters (2009), there are some
significant differences in the methods used to establish a link between our formal definition
of singled-plateauedness and its interpretation. Furthermore, the multi-valued case allows
us to work with a considerably richer setup when analyzing various alternative continuity
assumptions. In our generalized framework, moving from collinear interval continuity to
continuity (or even lower semicontinuity) imposes additional restrictions on possible choice
correspondences that do not play any role in the single-valued case.
In the following section, we state the formal definition of the choice correspondences
to be considered throughout the paper. The domain of our correspondence consists of all
non-empty, compact and convex subsets of Rn. The choice correspondence is assumed to
be closed-valued and convex-valued. We introduce the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives, familiar from the literature on rational choice. Because our domain is closed
under intersection, independence of irrelevant alternatives is equivalent to the weak axiom
of revealed preference. It is often more convenient to use one of the two equivalent axioms
in some of our later proofs and, in order to make the paper self-contained, we provide a
short proof of this well-known equivalence result as a preliminary observation.
Section 3 focuses on the definition, interpretation and characterization of our notion of
single-plateaued choice. We formulate the property by requiring that whenever a point x
is directly revealed preferred to another point y, then x must be directly revealed preferred
to any point on the half-line that starts at x and passes through y. This is in accord
with the one-dimensional notion of single-plateauedness for preference relations and we
prove that, using our definition, a single-plateaued choice correspondence has an important
characteristic that further underlines the appeal of this notion of single-plateauedness. In
particular, single-plateauedness implies that there exists a (possibly empty) closed and
convex subset P of Rn, to be interpreted as the plateau. Whenever the intersection of this
plateau and the feasible set is non-empty, the choice correspondence selects this intersection.
If the intersection of P and the feasible set is empty, the set of chosen points must be
contained in the boundary of the feasible set. These properties of P capture the idea
underlying single-plateauedness: there is a set of points that are chosen whenever feasible,
and as we move away from this plateau along any half-line, the points become progressively
less desirable. It is possible that the plateau is empty; this situation is the analogue
of a single-plateaued or single-peaked preference relation that is monotonic in the one-
dimensional space.
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Collinear interval continuity restricts the familiar continuity requirement to points along
a given straight line and our main characterization theorem establishes the equivalence of
single-plateauedness and collinear interval continuity in the presence of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Given the observation that independence and the weak axiom are
equivalent in our setting, the characterization result can be rephrased using the weak
axiom of revealed preference and independence of irrelevant alternatives interchangeably.
We conclude Section 3 with the statement of a corollary to this effect.
In Sections 4 and 5, we examine the consequences of using alternative continuity prop-
erties and the importance of the closedness and convexity assumptions that we impose on
chosen sets.
Our first observation in Section 4 is that, parallel to the single-peaked case discussed
in Bossert and Peters (2009), continuity of the choice correspondence is not implied by
the conjunction of independence of irrelevant alternatives and collinear interval continu-
ity. Thus, there are additional restrictions on choice correspondences if collinear interval
continuity is strengthened to continuity. We prove a theorem showing that, in the contin-
uous case, the set of plateau points P must be strictly convex rather than merely convex.
Moreover, if the intersection of P and the feasible set is empty, the resulting choice (con-
tained in the boundary of the feasible set) must be single-valued. We also point out that
lower semicontinuity, if added to independence and collinear interval continuity, leads to
the same additional restrictions: strict convexity of P and single-valuedness of boundary
choices when no plateau points are feasible. In contrast, upper semicontinuity cannot be
used in this fashion, as we illustrate with an example. Furthermore, we show that upper
semicontinuity or lower semicontinuity alone is not sufficient to imply collinear interval
continuity even in the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Section 5 shows that both closed-valuedness and convex-valuedness of the choice corre-
spondence are essential for our results. To this end, we provide an example of a choice cor-
respondence that satisfies independence, single-plateauedness and convex-valuedness but
violates closed-valuedness, and a closed-valued, independent and single-plateaued choice
correspondence that is not convex-valued.
Section 6 collects a few concluding remarks.
2 Independent choice correspondences
Suppose n ∈ N is fixed and let C = {C ⊆ Rn | C is non-empty, compact and convex}. A
choice correspondence is a mapping ϕ: C → Rn such that ∅ 6= ϕ(C) ⊆ C and ϕ(C) is closed
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and convex for all C ∈ C.
The direct revealed preference relation Rϕ of ϕ is defined as follows. For all x, y ∈ Rn,
xRϕy ⇔ there exists C ∈ C such that x ∈ ϕ(C) and y ∈ C.
The asymmetric part of Rϕ is denoted by Pϕ.
To define the direct revealed strict preference relation R∗ϕ of ϕ, let, for all x, y ∈ Rn,
xR∗ϕy ⇔ there exists C ∈ C such that x ∈ ϕ(C) and y ∈ C \ ϕ(C).
By definition – thus, independently of the assumptions on C and ϕ – the set inclusion
Pϕ ⊆ R∗ϕ is valid. To see that this is the case, suppose x, y ∈ Rn are such that xPϕy. Thus,
there exists C ∈ C such that x ∈ ϕ(C) and y ∈ C and, moreover, there does not exist a
D ∈ C such that y ∈ ϕ(D) and x ∈ D. This implies, in particular, that y 6∈ ϕ(C) and,
therefore, y ∈ C \ ϕ(C). Hence xR∗ϕy, which establishes that Pϕ ⊆ R∗ϕ.
The reverse set inclusion R∗ϕ ⊆ Pϕ does not follow without further assumptions. This
inclusion is a generalized version of Samuelson’s (1938) weak axiom of revealed preference.
See Bossert and Suzumura (2010, p. 17) for a discussion and alternative formulations of
the weak axiom of revealed preference. We state the set equality as a formal property.
Weak axiom of revealed preference. R∗ϕ = Pϕ.
Below we show that in our framework the weak axiom of revealed preference is equiv-
alent to the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is a contraction-
consistency condition imposed on a choice correspondence. It is often referred to as Arrow’s
choice axiom (see Arrow, 1959) but, as Shubik (1982, pp. 420–421 and p. 423, footnote 2)
remarks, the axiom already appears in 1950 in an informal note authored by Nash. A ver-
sion for single-valued choice is due to Nash (1950) in the context of axiomatic bargaining
theory.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all C,D ∈ C, ifD ⊆ C andD∩ϕ(C) 6= ∅,
then ϕ(D) = D ∩ ϕ(C).
For future reference, we note that, because our domain C is closed under intersection
(that is, for all C,D ∈ C, the intersection C ∩ D is also in C whenever this intersection
is non-empty), the weak axiom of revealed preference is equivalent to independence of
irrelevant alternatives; see Hansson (1968) for a generalization of this observation. We
provide a proof of this known result in order to make our paper self-contained.
4
Lemma 1 A choice correspondence ϕ: C → Rn satisfies independence of irrelevant alter-
natives if and only if ϕ satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. Suppose first that ϕ satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. Because
Pϕ ⊆ R∗ϕ by definition, we only have to establish the reverse set inclusion. Let x, y ∈ Rn
be such that xR∗ϕy, that is, there exists C ∈ C such that x ∈ ϕ(C) and y ∈ C \ ϕ(C). By
definition, this implies xRϕy. If yRϕx, there exists D ∈ C such that y ∈ ϕ(D) and x ∈ D.
The intersection C ∩D is non-empty because it contains x and y and, because C is closed
under intersection, C ∩D ∈ C. Furthermore,
x ∈ C ∩D ∩ ϕ(C) and y ∈ C ∩D ∩ ϕ(D)
and, by independence of irrelevant alternatives,
ϕ(C ∩D) = C ∩D ∩ ϕ(C) and ϕ(C ∩D) = C ∩D ∩ ϕ(D).
This implies
C ∩D ∩ ϕ(C) = C ∩D ∩ ϕ(D).
Because y ∈ ϕ(D) and y 6∈ ϕ(C), this contradicts our hypothesis. Thus, xPϕy.
Now suppose ϕ satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference, that is, R∗ϕ = Pϕ. Let
C,D ∈ C be such that D ⊆ C and D ∩ ϕ(C) 6= ∅.
Let x ∈ D ∩ ϕ(C). This implies xRϕy for all y ∈ C and, thus, for all y ∈ D because
D ⊆ C. If x 6∈ ϕ(D), let z ∈ ϕ(D). By definition, zR∗ϕx and, therefore, zPϕx by our
hypothesis. This contradicts xRϕz which follows from x ∈ ϕ(C) and z ∈ D ⊆ C. Thus,
x ∈ ϕ(D).
Now let x ∈ ϕ(D) which immediately implies x ∈ D and xRϕy for all y ∈ D. If
x 6∈ ϕ(C), let z ∈ D ∩ϕ(C). Because x ∈ ϕ(D) and z ∈ D, we obtain xRϕz. Furthermore,
x ∈ C because D ⊆ C and, because x 6∈ ϕ(C), zR∗ϕx which is equivalent to zPϕx by
the weak axiom of revealed preference, and we obtain a contradiction to xRϕz. Thus,
x ∈ D ∩ ϕ(C) which completes the proof.
As is well-known (and apparent from the proof), the second implication in the above lemma
– the weak axiom of revealed preference implies independence of irrelevant alternatives –
is valid even if the domain of a choice correspondence is not closed under intersection.
3 Single-plateaued choice correspondences
For distinct x, y ∈ Rn, `(x, y) denotes the straight line through x and y and [x, y,→) is the
half-line through y starting at x. Furthermore, [x, y] is the line segment with end points x
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and y. The (relatively) half-open sets [x, y) and (x, y], and the (relatively) open set (x, y)
are defined analogously in the usual way. The boundary of C ∈ C is denoted by bd(C) and
the interior of C is int(C). Convergence of a sequence of sets in C is defined in terms of
the Hausdorff metric for compact subsets of Rn.
Single-plateaued choice correspondences are defined as follows.
Single-plateauedness. For all distinct x, y ∈ Rn, if xRϕy, then xRϕz for all z ∈ [x, y,→).
Thus, single-plateauedness demands that if a point x is directly revealed preferred to an-
other point y, then x is directly revealed preferred to any point on the half-line that starts
at x and passes through y.
The following theorem provides a motivation of this definition. It states that, given in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives and single-plateauedness, there is a closed and convex
set (the plateau) such that, whenever the intersection of this plateau and a feasible set is
non-empty, this intersection is equal to the chosen set. If the intersection is empty, only
boundary points are chosen.
Theorem 1 Let the choice correspondence ϕ: C → Rn satisfy independence of irrelevant
alternatives and single-plateauedness. Then there exists a closed and convex set P ⊆ Rn
such that, for all C ∈ C,
(i) C ∩ P 6= ∅ ⇒ ϕ(C) = C ∩ P ;
(ii) C ∩ P = ∅ ⇒ ϕ(C) ⊆ bd(C).
Proof. Define
P = {x ∈ Rn | there exists C ∈ C such that x ∈ int(C) ∩ ϕ(C)}.
We first prove that this set P has property (i) of the theorem statement; (ii) follows
immediately from the definition of P . The proof is concluded by showing that P is closed
and convex.
(i) Suppose C ∈ C is such that C ∩ P 6= ∅.
First, we establish the set inclusion C ∩ P ⊆ ϕ(C). Let x ∈ Rn and D ∈ C be such
that x ∈ int(D) ∩ ϕ(D) and x ∈ C (and, thus, x ∈ C ∩ P ). By way of contradiction,
suppose x 6∈ ϕ(C). Let y ∈ ϕ(C). Since x ∈ int(D)∩ϕ(D), there exists z ∈ (x, y]∩D and,
by definition, we have xRϕz. Single-plateauedness implies xRϕy. Because y ∈ ϕ(C) and
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x ∈ C \ ϕ(C), we have yR∗ϕx and, by independence of irrelevant alternatives and Lemma
1, it follows that yPϕx, a contradiction. Hence x ∈ ϕ(C).
To prove the reverse set inclusion, suppose x ∈ ϕ(C). Let y ∈ C ∩ P . If y = x, we are
done. If y 6= x, consider the set [x, y] ⊆ C. Since y ∈ [x, y]∩P , the set inclusion established
in the preceding paragraph implies that y ∈ ϕ([x, y]). Furthermore, by independence of
irrelevant alternatives, x ∈ ϕ([x, y]) because [x, y] ⊆ C. Now let D ⊇ [x, y] be such that
x ∈ int(D). Then y ∈ ϕ(D) by the set inclusion established in the preceding paragraph.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives implies ϕ([x, y]) = [x, y] ∩ ϕ(D). Thus, we must
have x ∈ int(D) ∩ ϕ(D) and hence x ∈ P which, together with x ∈ ϕ(C) ⊆ C, implies
x ∈ C ∩ P .
To prove that P is closed, suppose x ∈ bd(P )\int(P ). Let C ∈ C be such that C∩P 6= ∅
and x ∈ int(C). Because C ∩ P = ϕ(C) and ϕ(C) is closed, we have x ∈ int(C) ∩ ϕ(C)
and thus x ∈ P . Thus, P is closed.
Finally, we show that P is convex. If P = ∅ or P is a singleton set, we are done. If P
contains at least two distinct elements x and y, let C ∈ C be such that [x, y] ⊆ int(C). Thus,
C∩P 6= ∅. By part (i) established earlier in the proof, ϕ(C) = C∩P . Therefore, x, y ∈ ϕ(C)
and, because ϕ is convex-valued, [x, y] ⊆ ϕ(C). Therefore, [x, y] ⊆ int(C) ∩ ϕ(C) and, by
definition of P , [x, y] ⊆ P which proves that P is convex.
In the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-plateaued choice corre-
spondences can be characterized by means of a continuity property restricted to half-lines.
The axiom is an adaptation of an analogous property formulated for single-valued choice
in Bossert and Peters (2009).
Collinear interval continuity. For all distinct x, y ∈ Rn and for all sequences 〈xi〉i∈N
and 〈yi〉i∈N such that xi, yi ∈ `(x, y) for all i ∈ N, if limi→∞ xi = x and limi→∞ yi = y, then
limi→∞ ϕ([xi, yi]) = ϕ([x, y]).
The following lemma will be used in the proof of our characterization of single-plateaued
choice (Theorem 2).
Lemma 2 Let the choice correspondence ϕ: C → Rn satisfy independence of irrelevant
alternatives and single-plateauedness. Then for all distinct x, y ∈ Rn, if xRϕy, then zRϕz′
for all z′ ∈ [x, y,→) and for all z ∈ [x, z′].
Proof. Let x, y, z, z′ ∈ Rn be as in the statement of the lemma. We consider all possible
cases to establish the claim.
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(i) If z = z′, the conclusion of the lemma follows immediately because all singleton sets
are in the domain C of ϕ and, thus, Rϕ is reflexive.
(ii) If z = x, zRϕz
′ follows from single-plateauedness.
(iii) If z ∈ (x, z′) and z ∈ ϕ([z, z′]), it follows that zRϕz′ by definition of Rϕ.
(iv) If z ∈ (x, z′) and z 6∈ ϕ([z, z′]), let w ∈ ϕ([z, z′]). Clearly, w ∈ (z, z′] and we
obtain wR∗ϕz and hence wPϕz by independence of irrelevant alternatives and Lemma 1.
By single-plateauedness, xRϕw and wRϕx and, thus, x,w ∈ ϕ([x,w]) by independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Because ϕ is convex-valued, this implies z ∈ ϕ([x,w]) because
z ∈ [x,w]. This implies zRϕw, contradicting wPϕz. Thus, case (iv) cannot occur and the
proof is complete.
Our main result is the following characterization of single-plateaued choice.
Theorem 2 Let the choice correspondence ϕ: C → Rn satisfy independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Then ϕ satisfies single-plateauedness if and only if ϕ satisfies collinear interval
continuity.
Proof. Suppose ϕ satisfies single-plateauedness. Let x, y ∈ Rn be distinct and consider
sequences 〈xi〉i∈N, 〈yi〉i∈N, 〈zi〉i∈N and
〈
zi
〉
i∈N such that x
i, yi ∈ `(x, y) for all i ∈ N,
ϕ([xi, yi]) = [zi, zi] for all i ∈ N, limi→∞ xi = x and limi→∞ yi = y.
Without loss of generality, assume that the sequences 〈zi〉i∈N and
〈
zi
〉
i∈N converge to z
and z, respectively (otherwise consider convergent subsequences). That is, limi→∞ zi = z
and limi→∞ zi = z. Clearly, z, z ∈ [x, y]. Let [x, y] = ϕ([x, y]). We prove that z = x and
z = y.
Suppose z 6∈ [x, y]. Thus, z 6∈ ϕ([x, y]) and, therefore, wR∗ϕz for all w ∈ [x, y]. Lemma
1 implies wPϕz for all w ∈ [x, y]. Without loss of generality, suppose x ∈ (z, y].
If zi ∈ [x, z] for all sufficiently large i ∈ N, then ziRϕw for all w ∈ [x, y] and hence
zRϕw for all w ∈ [x, y] by Lemma 2, a contradiction. Analogously, if zi ∈ (z, x] for all
sufficiently large i ∈ N, then wPϕzi for all w ∈ [x, y] and also ziRϕw for all w ∈ [x, y],
again a contradiction. Thus, z ∈ [x, y] = ϕ([x, y]). Using a parallel argument, it follows
that z ∈ [x, y] = ϕ([x, y]) and, therefore, [z, z] ⊆ [x, y] = ϕ([x, y]).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that z ∈ (x, z] and z ∈ [z, y]. For w ∈ (x, z), we
have w ∈ ϕ([x, y]) and thus wRϕz. Lemma 2 then implies wRϕzi for all sufficiently large
i ∈ N but we also have ziPϕw (by ϕ([xi, yi]) = [zi, zi] and Lemma 1), a contradiction.
Hence
[z, z] = [x, y] = ϕ([x, y]).
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Now suppose ϕ satisfies collinear interval continuity. Consider distinct x, y ∈ Rn such
that xRϕy and let z ∈ [x, y,→). We have to show that xRϕz. If z ∈ [x, y], the conclusion
follows immediately from independence of irrelevant alternatives. If z ∈ [x, y,→) \ [x, y],
suppose that, by way of contradiction, ¬xRϕz. This implies x 6∈ ϕ([x, z]). Let v ∈ ϕ([x, z]).
By independence of irrelevant alternatives, v ∈ ϕ([x, v]) and, using independence of irrel-
evant alternatives again (since x ∈ ϕ([x, y])), v ∈ (y, z]. For all w ∈ [y, v], we must have
either x ∈ ϕ([x,w]) or ϕ([x,w]) ⊆ (y, w]. Let wβ = βv + (1− β)y for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Define
β∗ = inf{β ∈ [0, 1] | x 6∈ ϕ([x,wβ])}. The existence of this infimum follows from the
observation that w1 = v ∈ ϕ([x, v]). Thus, x ∈ ϕ([x,wβ]) for all β ∈ [0, β∗). By collinear
interval continuity, x ∈ ϕ([x,wβ∗ ]) and ϕ([x,wβ∗ ]) ⊆ [y, wβ∗ ], a contradiction.
Combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we obtain the following corollary, which separates
conditions on the choice correspondence from conditions on the associated revealed prefer-
ence.
Corollary 1 A choice correspondence satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives and
collinear interval continuity if and only if it satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference
and single-plateauedness.
4 Continuity
The standard continuity axiom familiar from the relevant literature is a strengthening of
collinear interval continuity.
Continuity. For all C ∈ C and for all sequences 〈Ci〉i∈N with Ci ∈ C for all i ∈ N, if
limi→∞Ci = C, then limi→∞ ϕ(Ci) = ϕ(C).
Continuity is equivalent to the combination of upper and lower semicontinuity.
Upper semicontinuity. For all C ∈ C, for all sequences 〈Ci〉i∈N with Ci ∈ C for all i ∈ N,
for all x ∈ Rn and for all sequences 〈xi〉i∈N with xi ∈ ϕ(Ci) for all i ∈ N, if limi→∞ xi = x,
then x ∈ ϕ(C).
Lower semicontinuity. For all C ∈ C, for all sequences 〈Ci〉i∈N with Ci ∈ C for all i ∈ N
and for all x ∈ ϕ(C), if limi→∞Ci = C, then there exists a sequence 〈xi〉i∈N with xi ∈ ϕ(Ci)
for all i ∈ N such that limi→∞ xi = x.
The conjunction of independence of irrelevant alternatives and collinear interval continuity
is not sufficient to imply continuity. The following example illustrates this observation.
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Example 1 Define a relation R on R2 by
xRy ⇔ [|x1| < |y1|] or [|x1| = |y1| and |x2| ≤ |y2|]
for all x, y ∈ R2. Define a single-plateaued (and single-valued) choice correspondence ϕ
by letting ϕ(C) be the (singleton) set of R-best elements in C for all C ∈ C. Then ϕ
satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives and collinear interval continuity but it does
not satisfy continuity.
This example raises the question of which additional properties need to be satisfied if an
independent choice correspondence is to satisfy continuity rather than merely collinear
interval continuity. The following theorem provides an answer.
Theorem 3 Let the choice correspondence ϕ: C → Rn satisfy independence of irrelevant
alternatives and continuity. Then there exists a closed and strictly convex set P ⊆ Rn such
that, for all C ∈ C,
(i) C ∩ P 6= ∅ ⇒ ϕ(C) = C ∩ P ;
(ii) C ∩ P = ∅ ⇒ [ϕ(C) ⊆ bd(C) and |ϕ(C)| = 1].
Proof. Define P as in the proof of Theorem 1. In view of Theorem 1, it remains to be
shown that P is strictly convex and that choices are single-valued if case (ii) of the theorem
statement applies.
By Theorem 1, P is convex. If P is not strictly convex, the boundary bd(P ) contains a
line segment [x, y] with x 6= y. We can take a sequence 〈yi〉i∈N such that [yi, x] ∩ P = {x}
for all i ∈ N and limi→∞ yi = y. By (i), it follows that ϕ([x, yi]) = {x} for all i ∈ N. But
limi→∞[x, yi] = [x, y] and, again using (i), ϕ([x, y]) = [x, y], a contradiction to continuity.
If C ∈ C is such that C ∩ P = ∅, Theorem 1 implies ϕ(C) ⊆ bd(C). By way of
contradiction, suppose there exist x, y ∈ ϕ(C) such that x 6= y. Because ϕ is convex-
valued, [x, y] ⊆ ϕ(C). Independence of irrelevant alternatives implies ϕ([x, y]) = [x, y].
Let a sequence 〈Di〉i∈N be such that Di ∈ C, Di is strictly convex, x, y ∈ bd(Di) and
Di ∩ P = ∅ for all i ∈ N and, furthermore, limi→∞Di = [x, y]. By part (ii) of Theorem
1, ϕ(Di) ⊆ bd(Di) and, because ϕ is convex-valued, |ϕ(Di)| = 1 for all i ∈ N. Continuity
requires that ϕ([x, y]) is single-valued but we have ϕ([x, y]) = [x, y], a contradiction.
It is easy to see that in the second and third paragraphs of the proof of Theorem 3 only lower
semicontinuity of ϕ is used. Hence, the theorem remains valid if in its premise continuity is
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replaced by collinear interval continuity together with lower semicontinuity. From there, it
can be proved – by using the conclusion of the theorem – that ϕ is actually continuous. On
the other hand, the following example shows that we cannot replace continuity by collinear
interval continuity together with upper semicontinuity.
Example 2 Let n = 2 and let P = {x ∈ R2 | −1 ≤ |x1| ≤ 1, −1 ≤ |x2| ≤ 1}. For
λ ∈ R denote λP = {(λx1, λx2) | (x1, x2) ∈ P}. Define the choice correspondence ϕ as
follows. If C ∈ C with C ∩ P 6= ∅, then let ϕ(C) = C ∩ P . If C ∈ C with C ∩ P = ∅,
then let λC = min{λ ∈ R | λ > 1, λP ∩ C 6= ∅} and let ϕ(C) = C ∩ λCP . Then
ϕ satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, collinear interval continuity and upper
semicontinuity but not continuity.
We conclude the section with examples of choice correspondences showing that the combi-
nation of independence of irrelevant alternatives with either upper or lower semicontinuity
is not sufficient to guarantee single-plateauedness or – equivalently, in view of Theorem 2
– collinear interval continuity.
Example 3 Let n = 1, so C is the set of all intervals [a, b] with a ≤ b. We define the
choice correspondences ϕ1 and ϕ2 as follows. For all [a, b] ∈ C,
ϕ1([a, b]) =
{
[a, b] if b ≤ 0
[max{a, 0}, b] if b > 0
and
ϕ2([a, b]) =
{
[a, b] if b < 0
[max{a, 0}, b] if b ≥ 0.
Then both ϕ1 and ϕ2 satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives; ϕ1 satisfies upper but
not lower semicontinuity and ϕ2 satisfies lower but not upper semicontinuity. Both violate
single-plateauedness and collinear interval continuity.
5 Closedness and convexity
The assumptions that ϕ is closed-valued and that ϕ is convex-valued cannot be dispensed
with in our results – neither of them follows from our axioms. The following examples
show that closed-valuedness is required even in the presence of convex-valuedness and that
convex-valuedness is required even in the presence of closed-valuedness. For simplicity, we
state the examples for the one-dimensional case but they can be embedded in spaces of
higher dimension.
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Example 4 Let n = 1 and define a choice correspondence ϕ as follows. For all x, y ∈ R,
ϕ([x, y]) =

[x, y] ∩ (0, 1) if [x, y] ∩ (0, 1) 6= ∅;
{y} if y ≤ 0;
{x} if x ≥ 1.
This choice correspondence is convex-valued and satisfies independence of irrelevant alter-
natives and single-plateauedness. Closed-valuedness is violated.
Example 5 Let n = 1 and define a choice correspondence ϕ as follows. For all x, y ∈ R,
ϕ([x, y]) =

{y} if y ≤ 0;
{0, y} if x ≤ 0 and y ∈ (0, 1);
{x, y} if x > 0 and y ∈ (0, 1);
{0, 1} if x ≤ 0 and y ≥ 1;
{x, 1} if x ∈ (0, 1) and y ≥ 1;
{x} if x ≥ 1.
This choice correspondence is closed-valued and satisfies independence of irrelevant alter-
natives and single-plateauedness. Convex-valuedness is violated.
6 Concluding remarks
Our focus in this paper is on the description and characterization of single-plateauedness
in a general choice-theoretic setting. In the case of single-peaked choice, we also examined
notions of rationalizability and representability; see Bossert and Peters (2009). Because
the arguments involved are entirely parallel, we do not include a formal treatment of these
issues here.
In addition to our characterization which is of interest in its own right by clarifying some
links between single-plateauedness and a continuity property in the multi-valued frame-
work (Theorem 2), our results on the consequences of the definition of single-plateauedness
(Theorems 1,3) show that this is the natural way of formulating the notion of single-
plateauedness. Thus, our results provide a foundation for the assumption of ‘single-
plateaued’ preferences or utility functions in various applications.
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